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In many states, the judiciary was first to recognize the special
needs of close corporations.1 Then, following in the judiciary's foot-
steps, legislatures enacted special statutory provisions. With its re-
cent adoption of the ABA's Model Statutory Close Corporation
Act, 2 Montana joins the ranks of those states.
The Montana Close Corporation Act (MCCA), however, re-
stricts the power of the Montana Supreme Court to resolve close
corporation disputes. Judges no longer have complete freedom to
draft subjective judicial decisions tailored to their own ideologies.
They must instead contend with a statutory structure that com-
bines mandatory, enabling, supplementary and elective provisions.3
The judiciary must further reconcile Montana case law with
the legislature's policy goals. These goals are implicit in the
MCCA's statutory provisions, and exemplify a compromise be-
tween efficiency and equity." The court's ultimate challenge is to
recognize and enforce the spirit of this compromise.
This article examines the compatibility of the MCCA and
Montana case law from both a factual and theoretical perspective.
Section II sets forth an analytical framework based on economic
theory. Sections III and IV then apply the analytical framework to
* Attorney, Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, P.C., Billings, Montana. B.S., 1982,
Montana State University; J.D., 1989, University of Oregon. I wish to thank University of
Oregon Professor Charles O'Kelley for his guidance and inspiration. I also wish to thank
Jeanne Wilson and Curt "The Great Sage" Deford for their indispensable assistance.
1. Several characteristics are unique to close corporations: (1) familial relationship ex-
ists between shareholders; (2) no liquid market for shares; (3) relative ease of access to in-
formation; (4) shareholders are active in management; (5) share transfer restrictions are
common; (6) few shareholders; (7) shareholders are often dependent on corporate income;
(8) relatively small capital and earnings; (9) informal operations; (10) profits are distributed
as salary; (11) employment is contractually assured; (12) loss of benefits from lack of spe-
cialization; and (13) reliance on mutual monitoring of officers. For a general discussion re-
garding the definition of close corporations, see 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S
CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (3d ed. 1987).
2. The Montana Close Corporation Act is codified as MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-101 to
-504 (1989) [hereinafter MCCA]. The MCCA mirrors the ABA Model Statutory Close Cor-
poration Act [hereinafter Model Act] with the exception of defining a close corporation as a
corporation having 25 or fewer shareholders rather than the Model Act's limit of 50 share-
holders. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-103(2) (1989).
3. See infra section III. See also Kessler, The ABA Close Corporation Statute, 36
MERCER L. REV. 661, 698 (1985).
4. See infra section III.
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the MCCA and Montana case law addressing close corporations.
Finally, the article compares the results of the two analyses and
speculates on future Montana judicial decisions in close corpora-
tion disputes.
II. ANALYTIcAL FRAMEWORK
This analytical framework focuses on the relative importance
that legislators and judges place on minimizing costs and maximiz-
ing value. The more legislators and judges, through their legisla-
tion and decisions, strive to increase value and decrease costs, the
more they enhance efficiency. In contrast, a greater emphasis on
equity usually decreases the value of resources and increases costs,
but promotes an equitable distribution of wealth.5 While the poli-
cies of equity and efficiency can cohabitate, it is more likely that
advancing one necessarily hinders the attainment of the other.
For example, in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.,6 the majority
and dissent embraced opposing viewpoints because of a split in
policy objectives. In Jordan, an employee (Jordan) left the close
corporation of Duff & Phelps, Inc., to pursue alternative employ-
ment. By the time Jordan left the company, he had accumulated
$23,225 in company stock.7 Eleven days after Jordan's employment
terminated, the company announced a merger that would have in-
creased the value of Jordan's stock to $646,000.8 Jordan sued for
the difference in stock value.
In adopting Jordan's position, the majority relied on the close
corporation's implicit fiduciary duty to disclose material informa-
tion to shareholders.' An implied term in every contract, written or
oral, is that "neither party will try to take opportunistic advantage
of the other."' 0 The majority thus held that the corporation's fail-
ure to disclose the merger negotiations to Jordan justifies
5. The reader should also note the concept of diminishing marginal utility, which
asserts that there is a point at which the marginal utility for wealth declines. This point
occurs when an increase in a rich person's wealth results in a less proportionate increase in
his demand for rights than an increase in a poor person's wealth. For example, a rich person
owning three cars derives less utility from the right to buy a used car than a poor person
owning none. Hence, there is a point at which some degree of equality increases the value of
resources. See Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3,
19 (1975). See generally Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Effi-
ciency?, 98 HARv. L. REv. 592 (1985).
6. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
7. Id. at 432.
8. Id. at 433.
9. Id. at 434-35 (Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote the majority opinion.).
10. Id. at 438. For a definition of "opportunism," see infra note 19.
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In contrast, the dissent heavily relied on Jordan's employ-
ment-at-will status. Judge Richard A. Posner stated that the abil-
ity of the corporation to terminate Jordan's employment-at-will,
and. the existence of a stockholder agreement requiring the em-
ployee to sell back his shares upon termination, precluded the exis-
tence of any duty to disclose.' 2 He further urged that the major-
ity's holding creates implicit contractual obligations that are "an
expensive way of backstopping market forces" and violate the gen-
eral precepts of "freedom of contract."' 3
In short, the different outcomes of the majority and the dis-
sent in Jordan arose from an underlying split in policy objectives.
The majority opinion chose equity as its objective and then en-
forced an implied fiduciary duty of disclosure upon the contracting
parties. The dissent, on the other hand, chose efficiency as its ob-
jective, asserting the need to uphold only the express agreements
between transacting parties.
From a more specific viewpoint, this article's analytical frame-
work embraces the concept that, in a theoretically perfect market,
price directs all exchange transactions.' 4 Every exchange is volun-
tary and costless, which ensures that all parties to an exchange re-
alize economic benefit. Yet, in the real world, transacting parties
often confront uncertainties in the exchange process that make ex-
change costly. Enforceable agreements entered into ex ante, and
fair ex post resolution of unforeseeable problems can, however,
minimize these costs.
The two primary institutions that create ex ante agreements
and ex post resolution mechanisms are private firms and the gov-
ernment. Defining the government and the firm in their institu-
tional capacities is no easy task. Simply put, the government repre-
sents both legislative and judicial enforcement mechanisms
designed to avoid and resolve exchange conflicts.' 5
The definition of the firm, on the other hand, is subject to
much dispute. In its broadest sense, individuals create a firm when
11. Id. at 443.
12. Id. at 446.
13. Id. at 448-49.
14. This concept is commonly referred to as the Neoclassical Model. The Neoclassical
Model assumes that: (1) people will act in their own self interest; (2) people will act ration-
ally; (3) people will have access to perfect information; (4) perfect mobility exists; (5) no
artificial barriers to entry exist; and (6) the current distribution of wealth and resources is
unquestioned. These assumptions provide the "theoretical basis for assertions that the free
market is economically efficient." Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78
Nw. U.L. REv. 303, 310 (1983).
15. See generally B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984).
1991]
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the relationship of prices and costs results in vertical integration,
which then necessarily supersedes the market.1 6 For instance, if
General Motors could manufacture tires for less than it costs to
purchase them from Goodyear, it would integrate tire manufactur-
ing into its firm and no longer purchase tires on the open market.
By comparison, one scholar unintelligibly defines the firm by the
detectability of input performance and the expropriability of
quasi-rents of interspecific resources.1 7 A third definition, which
encompasses elements of the two previous definitions, describes
the firm as some variation of contractual arrangements entered
into to minimize costs and to maximize the value of resources. 8
It thus becomes necessary to consider both cost minimization
and resource distribution to determine the impact that legislative
and judicial decisions have on close corporation firms. How the
government resolves conflicts that arise in close corporations con-
trols the extent to which close corporation firms exist. Legislation
and judicial decisions control both the ability of close corporation
firms to avoid costs and the distribution of society's relative
wealth. The structure and efficacy of Montana close corporation
firms largely depends on whether Montana law champions mini-
mizing costs (efficiency) or attaining an equitable distribution of
wealth (equity). Therefore, this article next defines the parameters
of cost/distribution analyses.
A. Cost Analysis-Minimizing Costs
The contracting process inherently creates the existence of
two costs: (1) opportunism, 9 and (2) imperfect information. 0
16. See Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937), reprinted in G.
STIGLER & K. BOUKLING, READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 331 (1952).
17. See Alchian, Specificity, Specialization, and Coalitions, 140 J. INST. & THEORETI-
CAL ECON. 34, 39 (1984). See infra note 45 for a discussion of quasi-rents.
18. See Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & EcON. 1, 3 (1983).
19. "Opportunism" is defined as a "variety of self-interest seeking" methods that in-
cludes "self-interest seeking with guile." Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 234 n.3 (1979). Opportunism is
the foundation for the ethic of individualism. This ethic advocates that a person should
center on oneself to the exclusion of others. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1685 (1976). The plain cost of opportunism flows
from each individual doing what is best for, herself while wholly ignoring the interests of
others.
The counter ethic to individualism is altruism, the essence of which is the "belief that
one ought not to indulge a sharp preference for one's own interest over those of others." Id.
at 1717 (emphasis added). Altruism "enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share, and to be
merciful. It has roots in culture, in religion, ethics and art, that are as deep as those of
individualism." Id.
20. Opportunism and imperfect information are interrelated in that opportunism de-
[Vol. 52
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These costs are unavoidable in a capitalistic economy; hence, con-
tracting parties must contend with their existence by either ab-
sorbing them or contracting .around them. The costs of opportu-
nism and imperfect information are commonly set forth in terms of
subcategories of costs: price-discovery costs,
21 negotiation costs, 22
uncertainty costs, 23 monitoring costs, 24 loss-of-team-value costs,2 5
asset specificity costs, 26 and illiquidity costs. 2 7 Notably, none of
these costs are exclusive, rather they are all interdependent to
pends upon imperfect information and, conversely, imperfect information often exists due
to opportunism.
21. Price-discovery costs are simply the costs of "discovering what the relevant prices
are." Coase, supra note 16, at 390. Four factors determine the relative degree of price-dis-
covery costs. As the number of transactions increase: (1) the greater the variance in prices;
(2) the greater the difficulty of distinguishing between the final product price and compo-
nent prices; (3) the greater the amount of measurement required; and (4) the greater "the
problem of separating contributions." See Cheung, supra note 18, at 4-9.
22. Negotiation costs are primarily a function of the frequency rate of concluding sep-
arate contracts. Negotiation costs and the frequency rate are inversely related-as the fre-
quency rate increases, negotiation costs decrease. Hence, the first time two parties transact
their negotiation costs will be relatively high, but those costs continually decrease as the
parties become more familiar with their contractual relationship. See Coase, supra note 16,
at 390; Williamson, The Economics of Governance: Framework and Implications, 140 J.
INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 195, 202 (1984).
23. See Williamson, supra note 22, at 202.
24. Monitoring costs are defined as those costs associated with monitoring input pro-
ductivity and rewards. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organization, 5 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 778 (1972). Monitoring costs are primarily a
function of the human characteristic of shirking, that is, each person balances their work
rate and expected reward from their work against the personal value each person assigns to
leisure time. The greater the value that an individual places on leisure, or the less they
expect in relative rewards from their work, the more they will "shirk" from their work du-
ties. Id. at 780. For shareholders to effectively monitor each other and thereby decrease the
amount of shirking, they must have the power to modify the contractual relationship of the
participants. Id. at 782.
25. The value of a successful team results from using comparative advantage to allow
the sum of team work to exceed the sum of each individual's input. Id. at 779. The key to
preserving team value is to ensure that each individual's realized rate of substitution is close
to her true rate of substitution. Id. at 781. This deters negative externalities, or shirking,
and maximizes the value of each individual's work product, or capital resources.
26. As assets become more specific, the "costs of contracting will generally increase
more than the costs of vertical integration." Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integra-
tion, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcON. 297,
298 (1978). The more specific an asset is to the entity, the greater the corporation's induce-
ment to retain the asset because its value is greatest when held within the entity. It also
benefits the owner of the specific asset, whether human or physical, to remain cohesive to
the entity because severance results in an alternative use for the specific asset. Alternative
use of the specific asset results in a comparatively low value. See Williamson, supra note 22,
at 212-13.
27. See Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1, 44 (1977) ("Liquid-
ity is thus essential to the efficient allocation of resources in the capital market, and a sys-
tem that freezes allocation at the time of initial investment is inherently inefficient.").
5
Schermerhorn: EFFICIENCY VS. EQUITY IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1991
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
some degree.
The avoidance of these costs is often quantified in terms of
production efficiency.2 8 Firms become more efficient as they de-
crease the costs of production proportionate to the quantity of
goods produced, in other words, the cost of producing each individ-
ual unit decreases. By decreasing costs, firms can charge consumers
lower prices for goods while maintaining adequate profit levels. De-
creased costs benefit the firm through higher sales volume and also
benefit society through lower priced goods and services. The quest
to maximize efficiency is thus the backbone of a capitalistic mar-
ket. The desire to decrease costs creates competition for scarce re-
sources, driving firms to produce at an optimal level of efficiency.
Most courts and legislatures recognize the benefits of inter-
preting or promulgating law to enhance efficiency. However, courts
and legislatures also must deliberate policy considerations in the
decision-making process that compete against the goal of enhanc-
ing efficiency.29 Foremost among these competing policy considera-
tions is the goal of an equitable distribution of wealth.
B. Distribution Analysis -Maximizing Value
Increasing or decreasing the valuation of a party's legal rights
has wealth distribution effects. As the value of a party's rights in-
creases, the party can purchase more resources and, consequently,
the party's relative wealth increases. In addition, a corollary to this
concept is that each increase in the value of a resource expands the
wealth of the individual who owns that resource.
Proponents of efforts to maximize the value"0 of resources ar-
gue that legislatures and courts should distribute resources to the
party most willing and able to pay for that resource." They con-
28. Two main types of efficiency exist: (1) production efficiency, and (2) allocative effi-
ciency. Production efficiency focuses on minimizing the costs of production, whereas alloca-
tive efficiency is concerned with producing the right amount of the right goods. See Farber,
Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 303, 312 (1983). Allocative
efficiency is best discussed in the second part of this article's analytical framework, maxi-
mizing value. Allocative efficiency increases whenever firms maximize the value of goods.
See infra section I1(B).
29. See infra section 11(B).
30. Richard Posner, a conservative proponent of law and economic theory, defines
value as an individual's willingness or ability to pay for a given resource. R. POSNER, Eco-
NoMic ANAYSIS OF LAW 4 (1972). Willingness to pay is "a function of the existing distribu-
tion of income and wealth in a society." Id.
31. See R. POSNER, supra note 30. For an overview of this position, with authorities
cited therein, see J. OLIVER, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1979); Cohen, A Justification of Social
Wealth Maximization as a Rights-Based Ethical Theory, 10 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 411
(1987); Note, Efficiency and a Rule of "Free Contract": A Critique of Two Models of Law
and Economics, 97 HARV. L. REV. 978 (1984).
[Vol. 52
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tend that by directing resources in this manner, resources are put
to their highest valued use.2 This distribution, in turn, maximizes
society's overall welfare." However, this reasoning is circular be-
cause it is true only if one presumes that the pre-existing distribu-
tion of wealth is just.3 4 However, if the pre-existing distribution of
wealth is unjust, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.38 As
the chasm between the rich and poor expands, societal welfare
declines. 6
A policy that attempts to narrow the gap between rich and
poor is equity.3 7 Promoting an equitable distribution of resources
necessitates a paternalistic enforcement mechanism that allows
fairness to displace value maximization. 8 This paternalistic ap-
proach assigns higher values to the less advantaged party's rights,
compared to the previous approach, which focuses only on a
party's ability to pay for a given right. For example, if a close cor-
poration statute grants minority shareholders dissolution rights,
the value of the dissolution rights depends upon what price the
minority shareholders require to induce them to sell their rights.
Conversely, if no dissolution rights are granted, the value of disso-
lution rights becomes what the minority shareholders must pay the
majority shareholders to obtain the rights. This value is subject to
the minority shareholders' ability to pay the required price.39 The
32. R. POSNER, supra note 30, at 4.
33. Id. at 42. See also R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 67 (1981) ("It is the
almost universal opinion of economists that free markets, whatever objections can be made
to them on grounds of equity, maximize a society's wealth.").
34. See Baker, supra note 5, at 19. The underlying conflict between value maximiza-
tion and equality is the acceptance or rejection of the existing distribution of wealth. If one
relies upon the assumption that the existing distribution of wealth is just, this reliance on
an unjust distribution likely produces unjust results. In contrast, if the existing distribution
is deemed unjust, then a policy promoting equality becomes the instrumentality with which
to correct the market's failure in distributing wealth.
35. Id.
36. See Baker, Utility and Rights: Two Justifications for State Action Increasing
Equality, 84 YALE L.J. 39, 40-48 (1974).
37. See White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realisms: Jurisprudence and So-
cial Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999, 999 (1972). See also
G. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQuITY (1919).
38. See Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 766
(1985)("Some paternalistic restrictions on contractual freedom are not only permissible but
morally required."). See also R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985) (arguing that eco-
nomic efficiency fails to provide a sufficient moral basis for adjudication).
39. One can argue that minority shareholders may prefer not to have dissolution rights
provided that they can decrease their investment in the corporation while retaining the
same ownership interest as if they had dissolution rights. If this occurs, the minority share-
holders' expectations of protection from oppression, and their equitable rights to protection,
necessarily decrease. For this argument to prevail under an equitable approach, however,
one must presume that minority shareholders have sufficient resources available to purchase
1991]
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former policy favors equality; the latter favors value maximiza-
tion.40 This grant or denial of rights affects the relative value of an
individual's resources and, consequently, directs the distribution of
wealth within society.
With the foundation in place for cost/distribution analyses,
this article now focuses upon application. To properly analyze the
MCCA, this article sets forth cost analysis and distribution con-
cerns for each significant statutory provision. The analysis of the
MCCA is categorized into three areas: (1) share transfer restric-
tions; (2) organizational attributes; and (3) termination and
dissolution.
III. MONTANA CLOSE CORPORATION ACT
A. Share Transfer Restrictions
1. Cost Analysis
The MCCA's share transfer restrictions have contrasting cost
implications. There is an inherent value in developing a learning
curve within any successful management structure. 41 Managers ex-
pend significant time and energy in becoming familiar with other
managing participants and, as with any job, individuals gradually
realize and develop the parameters of their decision-making discre-
tion. The value of existing management increases as the frequency
that firms incur the costs of management turnover decreases.
The MCCA's right of first refusal42 gives corporations the abil-
ity to avoid turnover and thereby prevent new entrants from di-
minishing the value of successful core management. Imposing bar-
riers to new shareholder entry also avoids the likely renegotiation
of corporate documents to accommodate the new investor. When-
ever new investors enter a pre-existing entity, shareholders often
must amend the incorporation documents to account for changes
in relative duties and rights. The new shareholder's expectations
invariably differ to some degree from both the outgoing share-
holder's expectations and the pre-existing shareholders' expecta-
tions. The MCCA is thus cost favorable in that it avoids the costly
renegotiation of shareholders' rights and duties. 3
dissolution rights if they desire to do so. In other words, the minority shareholders' choice
must be void of any monetary coercion.
40. See Baker, supra note 5, at 12-13, 19. The crucial distinction is the difference
between the ability to pay for a right and the price required to induce one to sell a right
that he or she already possesses.
41. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 24, at 779.
42. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-202 and -203 (1989).
43. See supra note 22.
[Vol. 52
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 52 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/5
EFFICIENCY VS. EQUITY
The right of first refusal also decreases costs by allowing the
corporation the opportunity to keep valuable assets. The corpora-
tion is in the best position to determine the importance of the out-
going shareholder's assets." It has access to all relevant financial
information and has witnessed the productivity of the share-
holder's assets within the existing corporate structure. The corpo-
ration can thus more efficiently value the quasi-rents4 5 associated
with those assets, especially relative to outside investors who must
base their valuation on the information provided by the selling
shareholder.
The right of first refusal, however, also has several attributes
that increase costs. These costs are primarily attributed to the dif-
ficulty associated with establishing the purchase price of the outgo-
ing shares. To establish the purchase price, the shareholder must
locate and secure an acceptable cash offer from an eligible third
party." This process imposes significant price-discovery costs47 on
the parties.
In addition, the uncertainty regarding the sincerity of a third-
party offer creates a gambling atmosphere. If the corporation
thinks the offer is illusory, it may call the shareholder's bluff and
waive its right to purchase. If the corporation guesses incorrectly
and the offer is legitimate, then the shareholder may consummate
the sale to the third party in accordance with the terms of his offer
to the corporation." The corporation is then burdened with an in-
voluntary selection of a new participant. In contrast, if the corpo-
ration believes the offer is valid and if it deems the potential par-
ticipant is undesirable, it may exercise its right of first refusal to
avoid the undesirable purchaser.49
Accordingly, both the shareholder and the corporation must
incur considerable costs to ascertain the legitimacy of the opposing
party's position. Both parties must seek out market information on
44. See supra note 26.
45. The concept of quasi-rents is intertwined with asset specificity. As assets become
more specific to the entity, appropriable quasi-rents are created. A party has the opportu-
nity to extract value from the entity that exceeds the "book value" of the asset-the value
of the asset outside of the entity. However, the excess value is not always extractable. The
party having rights in the specific asset is merely placed in a stronger bargaining position to
increase the value of his resources and rights.
46. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-203 (1989). Montana Code Annotated section 35-9-
203(2) further provides that a third person is eligible to purchase shares if she can become a
qualified shareholder under any applicable federal or state tax statute, and if her purchase
of shares will not impose any penalty on the corporation.
47. See supra note 21 for a definition of price-discovery costs.
48. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-203(6) (1989).
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-203(1) (1989).
1991]
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the relative value of the shares. The majority shareholders must
also investigate the character of the third party who is a potential
participant in the corporation. If this individual is acceptable, dis-
covery costs imposed on the majority shareholders decrease and
the price that the majority shareholders are willing to bid likewise
decreases. If, however, the potential entrant is undesirable, the ma-
jority shareholders must embark on a very costly mission of price
discovery.
2. Distribution Concerns
The statutes addressing share transfer restrictions overwhelm-
ingly favor majoritarian rule; therefore, there is little emphasis on
equality. The majority shareholders may vary all the statutory re-
strictions on share transfers in the articles of incorporation.5 0 This
gives the majority shareholders the power at the outset to establish
discriminatory transfer rights that they can utilize to decrease both
the alienability and the liquidity of the minority's shares.
5 1
This argument presumes that most majority shareholders are
unwilling to enter into contractual relationships in which their rel-
ative control over ownership is not proportionate to their capital
contribution. By investing a relatively large percentage of the capi-
tal necessary to initiate a corporation, the majority shareholders
expect to retain a significant amount of control over corporate af-
fairs. Limiting transfer rights assures majority shareholders that
distribution of power and, consequently, bargaining position with
minority shareholders remains unchanged.
The share transfer statutes further require only a two-thirds
vote to approve a merger, share exchange or termination of a cor-
poration's close corporation status.52 Any of these events will nul-
lify any share transfer restrictions. Therefore, if the majority
shareholders control at least two-thirds of the shares, they may
simply vote to terminate close corporation status and thereby au-
thorize the transfer of their shares at-will.
53
The majority shareholders also control share transfer after a
shareholder's death. This control is critically important. The
50. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-202(1) (1989) ("except to the extent permitted by the
articles of incorporation ... .
51. In other words, the more restrictions that the majority shareholders place upon
share transfers, the harder it is for minority shareholders to sell their shares. More share
transfer restrictions decrease the liquidity of the minority shareholders' assets that are in-
vested in the corporation.
52. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-401 and -402 (1989).
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MCCA imposes a duty on the corporation to purchase the shares
of the deceased "only if so provided in its articles of incorpora-
tion."5' Ironically, if the shareholders implement this provision,
the corporation must purchase the shares from the estate of the
deceased, but the estate has no obligation to sell."5 This paradox
provides the majority shareholders with an incentive to omit the
provision because its implementation would increase the value of
the minority shareholders' shares by improving their bargaining
position. In addition, the majority shareholders gain no additional
rights and, hence, they find themselves in a relatively weaker posi-
tion if they utilize such a provision.
Because the provisions that mandate the purchase of a de-
ceased's shares favor minority shareholders' interests, it is odd that
the drafters of the MCCA did not make such a provision
mandatory subject to a unanimous vote of all ' the shareholders
before deletion. A unanimous vote would give the minority share-
holders a much greater ability to retain this right. Regardless, as
the MCCA is now written, it is unlikely that majority shareholders
would incorporate such a provision without obtaining a substantial
compromise from minority shareholders in other areas of
incorporation."6
Finally, note that two exceptions to transfer restrictions exist
that tend to enhance equity. The MCCA allows intracorporate
transfers to any holder of the same class of shares57 and, also, the
MCCA authorizes transfers to the shareholder's immediate family
or to a trust.5 8 Both of these rights, however, are minimized be-
cause the MCCA requires unanimous approval of all shareholders
to validate such transfers.59
54. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-205(1) (1989).
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-205(5) (1989).
56. Price is also an issue. Upon demand, the corporation first makes an offer to the
estate that must be accompanied by year-end financial statements. Unfortunately, interim
financial statements are optional, which imposes uncertainty costs on the estate. If the es-
tate either feels that the price is unfair or if the corporation refuses to purchase the shares,
the court is authorized to establish a fair price and compel purchase. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-
9-207 (1989). The court also has the ability to assign all court costs to one party if the court
decides that the other party negotiated in bad faith. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-208 (1989).
This determination of price and the assignment of litigation expenses is costly. A better
approach is to require that: (1) the estate must sell and the corporation must buy, and (2)
the court must enforce any mandatory buy-out price in the shareholder agreement. See
Kessler, supra note 3.
57. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-202(2)(a) (1989).
58. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-202(2)(b) (1989).
59. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-202(2)(c) (1989).
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The MCCA's provisions regarding the structural organization
of a close corporation's management generally promote cost mini-
mization. The MCCA upholds shareholder agreements that regu-
late corporate powers, management, and the relationship of the
shareholders.60 Shareholder agreements provide shareholders with
the freedom to contractually tailor their organization and manage-
ment to account for any specific characteristics unique to their
firm. Enforcing the parties' particular shareholder agreement mini-
mizes the costs associated with vague drafting and implied terms.
It also provides the courts with a solid basis from which to deter-
mine shareholder rights in the event of dispute.
Shareholders may further retain hands-on control of their firm
by eliminating the board of directors and/or bylaws, provided that
a provision to that effect is placed in the articles of incorporation.61
Allowing shareholders to substitute shareholder management for a
board of directors frees close corporations from the hierarchial
structures of large public corporations. As a result, each share-
holder likely retains some control over management decisions. This
promotes a reliance on consensual decision-making and, conse-
quently, mutual monitoring.62 Mutual monitoring, in turn, de-
creases the agency costs associated with opportunism 3 because
each shareholder has some control in management. The ability of
one or more individuals to exploit the corporation to elevate their
self-interest diminishes."
Another important attribute of the MCCA is that a close cor-
poration's failure to observe the usual corporate formalities does
not impose personal liability on the shareholders.6 5 This attribute
60. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-301(1) (1989).
61. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-302 and -303 (1989).
62. "Mutual monitoring" is simply defined as a situation in which each shareholder
has an interest in making sure that other shareholders are upholding their end of the bar-
gain. This largely applies to the employment setting rather than ownership structure.
63. See supra note 19. The agency costs associated with opportunism are often re-
ferred to as "shirking." See supra note 24.
64. The MCCA's tolerance of the potential growth in shareholder numbers after they
originally elect close corporation status undermines the efficacy of the mutual monitoring
attribute. The 25 person limit applies only to new corporations, not to existing closely-held
corporations that elected to incorporate according to the MCCA provisions. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-9-103(2) (1989).
65. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-306 (1989). While the limited liability provision helps
to deter technical litigation seeking to pierce the corporate veil, at least one commentator
asserts that this section should be extended to provide that informality is insufficient
grounds to invalidate any corporate action. See Kessler, supra note 3, at 678.
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promotes investment into close corporations because the risk of
personal liability is more predictable. Technical litigation seeking
to impose personal liability upon the shareholders is much less
likely. Consequently, the costs of negotiating with prospective in-
vestors diminishes and the value of close corporation stock
increases.
2. Distribution Concerns
At first glance, the MCCA appears to promote an equitable
approach to the formation and administration of a close corpora-
tion by enforcing shareholder agreements and thereby upholding
shareholder expectations. For instance, shareholder agreements
and any amendments thereto must be unanimous." Requiring
unanimous consent assures that each individual accepts and agrees
with the proposed organization of corporate powers. In addition, it
is important that shareholders have the opportunity to realize
their expectations at incorporation, because shareholders presuma-
bly resist consent until the proposed agreement is aligned with
their expectations.
The MCCA further supports an expectation approach because
it allows shareholders to "treat the corporation as a partnership.
6 7
Treating "the corporation as a partnership" necessarily implies an
increased sensitivity toward the fiduciary relationship among the
shareholders that also helps to advance shareholder expectations.
Several majoritarian provisions, however, undermine the equi-
table approach of protecting shareholder expectations. First, by a
two-thirds vote of each class of shares, shareholders can delete a
provision waiving the board of directors, then reinstate the board,
and thereby eliminate consensual rule in favor of majoritarian
rule." Second, by a two-thirds vote of each class of shares, share-
holders can authorize and approve a merger or share exchange.6 " If
utilized, this provision would effectively eliminate a corporation's
Nevertheless, another article states that the increased protection from piercing the cor-
porate veil is one of the primary reasons to elect the MCCA. See Bahls & Quist, The ABA
Model Statutory Close Corporation Act: A New Opportunity for "Made In Montana" Cor-
porations, 49 MONT. L. REv. 66, 112 (1988). See also Consumer's Co-op v. Olsen, 142 Wis. 2d
465, 490-91, 419 N.W.2d 211, 219-220 (1988). The Consumer's Co-op court held that even
though a corporation did not elect to incorporate according to existing close corporation
statutes, the mere existence of close corporation statutes provides legislative intent, as well
as articulates the purpose of close corporation law, to make lack of observance to corporate
formalities irrelevant to the issue of piercing the corporate veil.
66. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-301(1), (6) (1989).
67. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-301(2)(c) (1989).
68. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-302(4) (1989).
69. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-401 (1989).
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close corporation status and require that the corporation invoke
traditional corporate formalities. Finally, two-thirds of each class
can simply vote to terminate close corporation status,7 0 which then
requires the corporation to establish a board of directors and adopt
bylaws. 1
Therefore, a contrast does exist among the distributional ef-
fects of statutory provisions addressing organizational attributes.
While unanimity by consensus is available through shareholder
agreements, a two-thirds vote by the majority ultimately controls.
This creates confusion in the drafting process, a process that has
inherent costs in itself. For instance, if shareholders want consen-
sual rule, they must negotiate with the majority to opt into certain
provisions. At the same time, they must opt out of provisions that
allow a two-thirds vote to ultimately control the corporation. Be-
cause of these complexities, shareholders must hire corporate ex-
perts to properly draft incorporation documents. The quality of
the respective experts' advice thus largely determines the final dis-
tribution structure of the corporation.
C. Termination and Dissolution
1. Cost Analysis
Overall, the MCCA's provisions addressing termination .and
dissolution are relatively costly because the MCCA generally relies
on judicial dispute resolution rather than on self-policing. The
most effective self-policing mechanism that is absent from the
MCCA is dissolution-at-will rights." Although shareholders can
voluntarily grant dissolution-at-will rights to one or more share-
holders,73 the MCCA does not provide for a mandatory right of
dissolution at-will. Indeed, the MCCA considers dissolution an ex-
traordinary relief that is expressly limited to situations of last re-
sort in which all other forms of relief have failed to resolve the
dispute. 4 While this attribute of the MCCA furthers the likelihood
of perpetual corporate life, which is generally considered to be a
70. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-402(1) (1989).
71. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-303(2) (1989).
72. See generally Telser, A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. L. 27
(1980).
73. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-404(1) (1989). The MCCA also requires unanimous
consent to amend any such dissolution provision. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-404(2) (1989).
This requirement of unanimity, however, is diminished in light of the corporation's ability
to terminate close corporation status by a two-thirds vote, which eliminates all dissolution
rights.
74. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-504 (1989).
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positive attribute, it also necessitates giving the courts a very ac-
tive role in dispute resolution.
The most obvious cost of judicial resolution is the cost of legal
representation. Attorney fees, which continue to escalate in today's
litigious society, effectively deter smaller claims that are nonethe-
less meritorious. There are also additional costs associated with the
significant time delays involved in litigation. Time delays both de-
crease the realized value of damages once they are finally awarded
(money today is worth more than money three years from now)
and increase the possibility of error in the judicial process.75
Costs also exist in the inherent uncertainty of judicial out-
comes. The MCCA expressly authorizes courts to impose a variety
of judicial remedies, such as altering corporate decisions, removing
officers, requiring the payment of dividends, awarding damages, or
ordering a share purchase. 76 The court's determination of adequate
grounds to support a respective form of relief vary with the factual
circumstances of each dispute. This ad hoc approach diminishes
the certainty of future judicial outcomes that, in turn, causes both
courts and litigants to increase expenditures in the litigation pro-
cess. Also, granting the judiciary great discretion inherently creates
the risk that the court's ultimate remedy bears little relation to the
cost avoidance goals built into the MCCA.
2. Distribution Concerns
Depriving the minority shareholders of dissolution-at-will
rights greatly decreases the value of their interests. The liquidity
of their stock is diminished because of the limited scope of market-
ability of close corporation stock. Usually no ready market exists
within which shareholders can sell their shares; therefore, the only
way to exit from a close corporation is through dissolution.77 Fur-
thermore, the high costs of litigation often act as a deterrent that
prevents shareholders from seeking judicial resolution. The bar-
gaining position of minority shareholders is thus quite weak. More-
over, this situation is compounded if litigation does result because
minority shareholders must overcome the likely advantage that
majority shareholders have as a result of being the more exper-
ienced and wealthier of the two parties. 78
75. See Solomon & Solomon, Using Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques To
Settle Conflicts Among Shareholders Of Closely Held Corporations, 22 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 105, 111-12 (1987).
76. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-502 and -503 (1989).
77. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 27, at 43.
78. See Solomon & Solomon, supra note 75, at 111.
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The minority shareholders' interest is further devalued by the
provisions authorizing two-thirds vote of each class to effectively
terminate a corporation's close corporation status.79 Terminating a
corporation's close corporation status propels several conse-
quences: (1) it voids the right of first refusal;80 (2) it voids compul-
sory share purchase after death;81 (3) it requires the corporation to
draft bylaws and elect a board of directors;8" (4) it voids any disso-
lution rights;83 and (5) it requires the corporation to comply with
the Montana Business Corporation Act.8 4 By terminating close cor-
poration status, the majority shareholders can, therefore, circum-
vent several possible minority shareholder expectations and de-
crease the value of the minority shareholders' rights.
Offsetting the above majoritarian provisions are several provi-
sions favoring equality. The most important of these is that share-
holders retain dissenter's rights if they vote against the termina-
tion of close corporation status8 5 Shareholders also have the right
to sue for illegal, oppressive, fraudulent or unfairly prejudicial
acts.' Deadlock is also grounds for judicial relief, provided that
the corporation is subject to irreparable injury or a shareholder is
generally disadvantaged because of the lack of normal business
conduct.8 7 The broad language of the deadlock provision makes lit-
igation based on deadlock easy to support. Minority shareholders
can use the threat of litigation based on deadlock to gain greater
leverage in shareholder disputes.
The parties can avoid the minority shareholders' leverage by
including a nonjudicial dispute resolution mechanism in the share-
holder agreement. Nevertheless, while such a provision can be ad-
vantageous at the time a future dispute arises, proposing such an
agreement at incorporation may produce a dispute in itself. The
parties are initially amiable and cooperative, and bringing the issue
79. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-202(2)(g) (1989).
81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-205(1) (1989).
82. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-303(2) (1989).
83. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-402(1) (1989).
84. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-403(1) (1989).
85. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-402(3) (1989).
86. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-501(1)(a) (1989). This language is different from'the
language in the corresponding general corporation statute in that it adds "unfairly prejudi-
cial" acts. Id. The effect of the addition is to further the principle that minority sharehold-
ers are "entitled to relief upon a showing of serious misconduct by those in control." Hill-
man, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the
Relative Performance of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 41
(1982).
87. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-501(1)(b) (1989).
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of future disputes to the surface has a disruptive affect. It implies
distrust of the parties' future ability to resolve disputes without
excessive conflict. A more apparent deterrent to the use of nonjudi-
cial dispute resolution mechanisms is that the vast majority of lay-
men and lawyers lack an adequate understanding of the costs and
consequences of nonjudicial dispute resolution mechanisms. This
ignorance causes them to rely on traditional judicial dispute reso-
lution mechanisms rather than nonjudicial means.88
'IV. MONTANA CASE LAW
Five Montana Supreme Court cases focus on close corporation
disputes. The diverse facts in these cases required a case-by-case
approach by the court to resolve these corporate conflicts. This
case-by-case approach arguably precludes any meaningful objective
review. A comparative inquiry of the court's reasoning in each case,
however, reveals a trend in the court's development of an analyti-
cal framework for close corporation disputes.
In 1966, Thisted v. Tower Management Corp.89 presented the
Montana Supreme Court with a close corporation shareholder dis-
pute over management. Thisted involved a condominium project
wherein each purchaser of a condominium received one share of
stock in the management corporation."0 The original incorporator
and his son-in-law controlled a majority of the twenty shares
outstanding.91
The conflict arose when the majority shareholders sought to
undertake extensive remodeling, presumably to enhance the sale of
the remaining units, and the minority shareholders objected.2 At
the subsequent annual shareholders meeting, the election for the
board of directors resulted in a deadlock.9 3 The defendant then
used a technicality to disqualify one voter, thereby re-electing him-
self to the board.94 As a result, ten of the shareholders brought suit
to contest the election and to enjoin the directors from acting. 5
In siding with the minority, the court first held that the de-
88. If a nonjudicial dispute resolution clause is provided, the shareholders must ex-
haust the nonjudicial remedy prior to commencing a judicial proceeding. See MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-9-501(3) (1989).
89. 147 Mont. 1, 409 P.2d 813 (1966).
90. Id. at 9, 409 P.2d at 818.
91. Id. at 10-11, 409 P.2d at 818-19.
92. Seven units remained unsold at the time of the dispute. This project was to be
funded by levying assessments against all shareholders on a pro rata basis. Id.
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fendant's manipulations to maintain control and his calloused
treatment of the stockholders, indicated a lack of good faith, con-
stituting a breach of his fiduciary relationship to the stockhold-
ers."6 The court then noted that "intracorporate problems arising
in a close corporation demand the unusual and extraordinary rem-
edies available only in a court of equity. ' 97 Accordingly, the court
stripped the defendant of his positions as officer and director and
appointed a receiver to exercise complete control over the corpora-
tion until the deadlock was resolved and an equitable election
held. '
Although the court recognized the need to consider "equity as
to all parties," 99 it ultimately relied upon the express terms of the
bylaws:
It must be remembered that Peters [the defendant] was one of
the incorporators of Management. The language found in the ar-
ticles of incorporation and the bylaws was composed with his ap-
proval. It must be assumed that such language reflects his pur-
poses and intentions at the time of incorporation. Such language
therefore binds him at this time.'00
The reasoning of Thisted is consistent with the established policy
of construing language of a document against its drafter. Neverthe-
less, future courts could interpret this language as laying the foun-
dation for an expectation-based analysis-look to the express
terms of the incorporation documents to discern a shareholder's
purposes and intentions. It follows that the expectations existing
at incorporation supersede expectations that subsequently develop.
The Thisted court paralleled this reasoning by holding that the
language in the bylaws bound the majority shareholders at the
time the future dispute arose.1"'
In sum, the facts of this case uniquely allowed the Montana
Supreme Court to promote both equity and efficiency. Equity was
heightened as the court reprimanded the majority shareholders for
96. Id. at 13, 409 P.2d at 820. Defendant engaged in several abrasive acts: (1) failure
to inform the minority of expected expenditures; (2) reliance on technical discrepancies in
notice requirements as a reason not to convene meetings; (3) walking out of meetings at
random; and (4) threatening the stockholders with a lawsuit. Id.
97. Id. at 14, 409 P.2d at 820.
98. Id. at 13, 409 P.2d at 820. The court also imposed all of the renovation project
costs and court costs upon defendant. Id. at 20, 409 P.2d at 824.
It should be noted that dissolution was unavailable as an option because of the nature
of the corporation. The corporation's existence was necessary to manage the condominium
complex in which each stockholder owned fee-simple title to one unit.
99. Id. at 18, 409 P.2d at 823.
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their oppressive acts. Stripping majority shareholders of their con-
trol increases the value of minority shareholders' rights. The
Thisted court further advanced equity by giving weight to the par-
ties' expressed expectations.
Likewise, efficiency was advanced because the court elimi-
nated the inherent transactional and organizational costs associ-
ated with disruptive management. Furthermore, the court upheld
the express agreement between the parties, which promoted cer-
tainty and avoided renegotiation costs. The Thisted decision,
therefore, provides precedent that promotes two competing policy
choices-equity and efficiency.
It was not until 1981 that a close corporation dispute again
received a leading role on the Montana Supreme Court docket. In
Skierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc.,102 two brothers were initially part-
ners in a farm and ranch business. Upon one brother's death (Al-
bert), the surviving brother (John) and the deceased partner's
widow (Jeanne) completed the incorporation of the partnership
that the two brothers had started prior to Albert's death.103 Both
parties transferred all property used in the partnership operation,
plus their personal residences, to the corporation.104 The different
valuations of the two residences, however, caused John to acquire
more shares than Jeanne. Evidently, neither party was aware of
the significance of unequal ownership, nor of the effect of including
a right of first refusal provision in the articles of incorporation. °10
After two years, a problem arose when Jeanne realized the sig-
nificance of her minority shareholder position and the restrictions
on the sale of her stock. She promptly requested equal ownership,
but John ignored her request.1°6 Two years later, Jeanne made two
alternative proposals: (1) create a new office carrying the same
powers as president and appoint Jeanne to that position; or (2)
increase the number of directors from four (John and his wife, and
Jeanne and her daughter) to five to break the deadlock.10 7 Both
proposals were voted down. Jeanne then brought suit seeking dis-
solution while alleging fraud, oppression, waste of corporate assets,
102. 192 Mont. 505, 629 P.2d 214 (1981).
103. Id. at 508-09, 629 P.2d at 215-16.
104. The residences were transferred solely for tax purposes. Id. at 509, 629 P.2d at
216.
105. The court noted that "the evidence indicates that none of the parties appreciated
the significance of the control which the defendant John's family obtained." Id. At trial, the
attorney and the accountant that were present at incorporation admitted "that they told
Jeanne that the unequal stock ownership was not really important." Id. at 514, 629 P.2d at
219.
106. Id. at 510, 629 P.2d at 216.
107. Id. at 510, 629 P.2d at 217.
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and deadlock." 8
Citing Thisted, the Skierka court noted that it retains broad
equitable powers when facing the special circumstances inherent in
a close corporation dispute. 10 9 Importantly, the court found that
equitable considerations were even more compelling in this case
than in Thisted because John was both a surviving partner and the
executor of Albert's estate.110
The court reasoned that this trust relationship had two effects.
First, John breached his duty as trustee by "permit[ting] a result
which placed him in [the] superior position" of majority share-
holder control.1 ' Second, John's duty to disclose, adverse matters
superseded Jeanne's duty to read and understand the express
agreement. " The court concluded that lack of disclosure and mis-
understanding of the agreement created a situation of mutual mis-
take that necessarily rescinded the contract." 3
The Skierka court also used independent grounds of oppres-
sion to support voiding the parties' agreement. The court found
that oppression existed because John's family fixed the stock valu-
ation in accordance with their right of first refusal. " ' John's family
also denied Jeanne's proposal to establish a new management posi-
tion."' The court failed to reconsider, however, its earlier observa-
tion that, since incorporation, Jeanne was "able to withdraw all the
money she [had] needed and that John [had] managed the corpo-
ration competently and efficiently. '"1 6
The court, in effect, held that the dissenting shareholder's
original expectation that equal ownership would ensue or, in the
alternative, that unequal ownership would be irrelevant, super-
seded all other considerations. Accordingly, the Skierka court or-
dered the corporation to transfer to the plaintiff her property and
to reimburse the plaintiff for the fair market value of other corpo-
rate assets existing at incorporation." 7 If the parties failed to reach
an agreement regarding the fair market value or the terms of reim-
108. Id.
109. Id. at 519-20, 629 P.2d at 221-22.
110. Id. at 512, 629 P.2d at 219. John was acting as the estate's trustee at the time of
incorporation, which occurred three months after Albert's death. Id. at 508, 629 P.2d at 215-
16.
111. Id. at 514, 629 P.2d at 219.
112. Id. at 516, 629 P.2d at 220.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 517, 629 P.2d at 220.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 515, 629 P.2d at 219.
117. Id. at 507, 629 P.2d at 215.
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bursement, the court would force dissolution.11 8
The Skierka court's "delegation of value determination" ap-
proach imposes significant costs upon the participants. Giving the
participants discretion to determine which property to transfer,
and at what value, necessitates extensive negotiation and price-dis-
covery costs. For instance, if the majority shareholders believe that
adequate quasi-rents exist that are inherent in the property if they
maintain the property as one unit rather than piecemealing it,""
the majority shareholders will try to negotiate to the margin at
which price equals the value of asset specificity. Unfortunately, ne-
gotiation costs largely offset any potential gains realized from sal-
vaging the benefit of value specific assets. 2 '
By comparison, the distributional effects of the "delegation of
value determination" approach favors the minority shareholder.
The minority shareholder, in Skierka, recouped the original prop-
erty transferred and also was given the opportunity to extract
value from the corporation that she had not contributed to in over
eight years. 2' For example, assume dissolution value of a corpora-
tion is $100,000, going concern value is $500,000, and each party
owns a fifty percent interest in the entity. The negotiation floor
price is $50,000 because the minority shareholder has no incentive
to go below its share of the dissolution value. The maximum price,
however, is $450,000. At this price, the majority shareholder is
compensating the minority shareholder $450,000 to retain the
$500,000 value of the going concern, thereby receiving the same
$50,000 of value as if dissolution had occurred. The final price will
fall somewhere between these polar extremes, depending upon the
majority shareholders' ability to pay, the relative risk that cash
flow is able to recoup the value of quasi-rents paid, and the rela-
tive degree of opportunism in the negotiation process.
In the next close corporation case, Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co.,
22
the Montana Supreme Court strengthened its position of resolving
close corporation disputes with an expectation-based analysis. In
Fox, Melvin Fox brought an action to dissolve and liquidate a fam-
ily corporation. Melvin owned fifty percent of 7L Bar Ranch,
118. Id.
119. In other words, the assets are specific to the property if maintained as a unit.
120. The parties have experienced years of dispute and litigation, and the court has
given the minority shareholder the influential club of possible dissolution to pound on the
table.
121. Skierka, 192 Mont. at 507, 629 P.2d at 215. Albert died in 1973 and this case was
decided in 1981. During the interim only John was active in the business.
122. 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982).
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which farmed 17,600 acres. 2 ' The family owned a second corpora-
tion named Fox Land & Cattle Company, which was involved in
the cattle and real estate business. Melvin owned a twenty-five
percent interest in the Fox Land & Cattle Company. 24 The family
also had a third corporation named Fox Ranches, Inc., a 14,463
acre cattle ranch of which Melvin owned slightly less than fifty
percent.12 5 Three other family members owned the remaining in-
terests in the corporations. 26
Fox Land & Cattle was the exclusive lessee of 7L Bar's grazing
land and was its sole financing agent. Therefore, the cash flow of
7L Bar, the corporation in which Melvin held a fifty percent inter-
est, was controlled by Fox Land & Cattle, the corporation in which
he held only a twenty-five percent interest.12 7 This situation al-
lowed Melvin's brother, who was the general manager of all three
corporations, to significantly discount the price paid to 7L Bar for
grazing rights and to deny the declaration of dividends. 128 Indeed,
Melvin never received any dividends or payments of any kind from
any of the corporations in spite of their financial success.2 9
The Fox court's analysis focused on whether the factors of op-
123. Id. at 203-05, 645 P.2d at 930-31.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Ownership of the three corporations was as follows:
7L Bar Ranch Co.
Melvin Fox 1,500 shares
Richard Fox 1,499 shares
Lydia Fox (Mom) 1 share
[Moral: always send Mom a Mother's Day card.]
Fox Land & Cattle
Treasury Stock 144 shares
Richard Fox 678.5 shares
Melvin Fox 678.5 shares
Lydia Fox 2 shares
Sharon (Fox) Wolfe 600 shares
(Richard & Melvin's sister)
Marital deduction trust 925 shares
(beneficiary: Lydia)
Fox Ranches, Inc.
Lydia Fox 120 shares
Melvin Fox 1,717.5 shares
Richard Fox 1,700.5 shares
Id. at 205, 645 P.2d at 931.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Fox Land & Cattle and Fox Ranches, Inc. showed retained earnings exceeding
$400,000, and Fox Land & Cattle also had cash assets exceeding $400,000. Id.
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pression and deadlock were sufficient to support dissolution. The
court stated that underlying equities must support a statutory
grant of dissolution rights. 80 Underlying equities are, in turn, ana-
lyzed by determining shareholder expectations:
Because of the special circumstances underlying closely held cor-
porations, courts must determine the expectations of the share-
holders concerning their respective roles in corporate affairs."
The court reasoned that, in this case, the majority shareholders
breached three of Melvin's expectations: (1) the right to a return
on his shares; (2) the right to participate in management; and (3)
his expectation that 7L Bar wouldreceive a fair market value for
its leased property.1 32 These expectations came to fruition after his
father's death, as Melvin "had a reasonable expectation of sharing
in his inheritance. '" 13 -  Therefore, the Fox court ordered
dissolution.
8 4
Nevertheless, the Fox court's reliance on an expectation-based
analysis appears ill-founded because of the court's failure to
ground the analysis in equity. First, Melvin relinquished farm
management in 1972 because of family disputes, and returned only
after his father's death. 35 It was thus arguably the expectation of
all the shareholders that Melvin would no longer participate in
management. Second, in contrast to the opinions in Thisted and
Skierka, the Fox court ignored the parties' expectations at incor-
poration. Instead, the court determined expectations at the time of
the father's death, ten years after incorporation.
At no time prior to the father's death had the corporation paid
dividends, nor had the shareholders expected dividends. Melvin's
new-found expectations in corporate income appear grounded
upon his taking out a bank loan secured with corporate stock, upon
which he had recently defaulted.'36 The court argued that this loan
evidenced his expectation of sharing in the corporation's value.3 7
130. Id. at 208, 645 P.2d at 933 ("The ABA Comments, quoted in the Annotations to
section 35-1-921, Vol. [7], states: 'When there is a statutory grant of such a power there are
still two factors with which one seeking dissolution must contend: (1) Courts have tended to
construe the statutes as discretionary rather than mandatory, even though the language of
the particular statute may appear to make it mandatory. (2) Courts have tended to look
beyond the language of the statute and into the equities of the situation.' ").
131. Id. at 210, 645 P.2d at 933 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 211-13, 645 P.2d at 934-35.
133. Id. at 214, 645 P.2d at 936.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 204, 645 P.2d at 930.
136. Id. at 205, 645 P.2d at 931.
137. Id. at 214, 645 P.2d at 936.
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The contrary argument is that he merely sought to. exploit a non-
controlling interest in a family corporation for personal gain. Any
expectation he had of extracting corporate value to ward off credi-
tors was unreasonable.
Given the weak underpinnings for an expectation-based analy-
sis, alternative considerations arguably form the basis for the
court's outcome of ordering dissolution. Foremost among these al-
ternative considerations is avoiding the future costs associated
with the shareholders' "deep-seated animosity," which would likely
have an adverse effect on future corporate operations. 138 In addi-
tion, the adverse cost consequences resulting from the dissolution
of this corporation were minimal because of a lack of asset specific-
ity in a 14,000 acre block of grazing land. In other words, two sepa-
rate seven thousand acre blocks are equally marketable. Moreover,
the ranching operations were sound financially and very liquid.
The splitting of the three corporations had little effect on the via-
bility of the entire operation. In short, the Fox court appears to
have commingled cost avoidance goals with the equitable concerns
of freeing the minority shareholder's interest.
The Montana Supreme Court decided the fourth case address-
ing close corporations, Maddox v. Norman,"'9 one year after Fox.
In Maddox, the father incorporated the family ranch in 1961 and,
in 1970, he transferred the majority of the shares to his three chil-
dren-Frank, Faye and Donald. 140 When this case commenced,
Frank owned ninety percent, Donald five percent, and Faye five
percent. 41 Frank was the only child active in ranch operations.
Faye was not even aware of her stock ownership until 1979, when
the corporation first notified her of an annual meeting.
1 42
At that meeting, Faye demanded an accounting of all corpo-
rate income and expenses from 1970 to present.143 The corpora-
tion's accounting was commingled with Frank's personal account
and Frank had never kept any separate records.1 44 A detailed re-
port was never given. 4 5 At the subsequent annual meeting, eight
months after their father's death, the parties agreed to obtain an
138. Id. at 205, 645 P.2d at 931.
139. 206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (1983).
140. Id. at 4, 669 P.2d at 232.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 5, 669 P.2d at 232. The corporation hired a new accountant in 1979, who
caused it to follow statutory formalities. Id.





Montana Law Review, Vol. 52 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/5
EFFICIENCY VS. EQUITY
appraisal of ranch assets. 146 After the appraisal, the parties stipu-
lated to pay Faye and Donald $175,000 for their shares, contingent
upon the corporation obtaining financing. 147 The corporation was
unable to secure financing and the agreement lapsed.1 48 Faye and
Donald subsequently filed suit alleging misapplication and waste of
corporate funds, and they requested dissolution as a remedy.
1 49
Prior to trial, the corporation settled with Donald for $20,000
and twenty acres of farmland. In Faye's subsequent suit, the dis-
trict court viewed Donald's prior settlement as ,"a 'strong indica-
tion' of the fair market value of the stock."' 0 Therefore, although
Faye won her case, the court ordered Faye to sell her shares to the
corporation for an amount equal to Donald's settlement.16 Faye
appealed.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's remedy
of a forced sale of stock. 52 In denying dissolution, the court em-
phasized that it must determine the availability of dissolution as a
remedy on a case-by-case basis.1 53 Three elements are controlling
in this determination: (1) the existence of a statutory right to dis-
solve; (2) the existence of underlying equitable grounds; and (3)
the nonexistence of adequate alternative remedies. 15 4 While the
court found that the statutes clearly provide that misapplication of
corporate funds warrants dissolution, it held that, in this situation,
the equitable considerations were insufficient to support
dissolution.
855
The court cited six reasons why the requisite level of equitable
considerations were lacking to force the corporation to dissolve: (1)
the corporation was a solvent, on-going business; (2) dissolution
would unjustly harm Frank; (3) Frank owned over ninety percent
of the shares; (4) Faye's "apparent expectation" was only to "get
her money out of the corporation quickly"; (5) alternative remedies





150. Id. at 9, 669 P.2d at 234.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 16, 669 P.2d at 238.
153. Id. at 11, 669 P.2d at 236.
154. Id. at 13, 669 P.2d at 236. Although the court upheld the forced sale of Faye's
shares to the corporation, it rejected Donald's settlement as a proper gauge of the value of
Faye's shares. Instead, the court reasoned that the value of Faye's shares should be based
upon the net value of the corporation, the corporation's cash flow, and the initial $175,000
settlement offer. Id. at 17-18, 669 P.2d at 238-39.
155. Id. at 12, 669 P.2d at 236.
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than dissolution."' 56 Based on these six factors, the Maddox
court's reasoning either expands or nullifies the reasonable expec-
tation-based analysis used by the Montana Supreme Court in close
corporation disputes. On the one hand, for the first time the Mon-
tana Supreme Court explicitly considered the reasonable expecta-
tions of all shareholders, not just the dissatisfied shareholder. The
court gave considerable weight to Frank's expectations regarding
the labor and improvements he expended during his management
of the farm.157 This type of consideration has an expansive affect
on the Montana Supreme Court's expectation-based analysis,
which most commentators view as positive. 58 On the other hand,
for nine years Faye was completely unaware of her ownership in
the corporation, thus, she had no expectations during that time.
Once she did become aware of her corporate interest, her only goal
was to extract it. This objective was not a result of Faye's inability
to realize her expectations; instead, it was merely driven by self-
interest.
However, rather than enforcing expectations, the court argua-
bly placed greater weight upon reducing intracorporate conflicts
and liberating captive assets. By forcing Faye to sell her shares at a
relatively discounted price, the court eliminated the transaction
costs inherent in a disruptive force within corporate ownership.
More importantly, the court freed assets that were otherwise uti-
lized in a non-optimal manner. Put another way, the majority had
no incentive to maximize the return on the minority shareholder's
interest because once oppression occurred, the minority share-
holder was unable to monitor the majority shareholder's decisions.
Likewise, the minority shareholder had no incentive to expend
human resources into the corporation because she was not receiv-
ing an adequate return on her investment. In contrast, if her cap-
tive assets were liberated, the minority shareholder could vigor-
ously reinvest those assets and realize a greater return on her
resources. Allocative efficiency, therefore, would be enhanced as
the overall value of resources increased. Production efficiency also
would increase because of the decreased monitoring costs associ-
ated with ownership conflicts. 5 9
The final case in this discussion of Montana's close corpora-
156. Id. at 13, 669 P.2d at 236.
157. Id.
158. See Hillman, supra note 86, at 75.
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tion case law is Gray v. Harris Land & Cattle Co., 60 decided in
1987. In Gray, the corporation executed an agreement that pro-
vided, in part, that so long as all the shareholders remain alive, the
written consent of all remaining shareholders was necessary to ap-
prove any sale of stock.16' All five family shareholders signed this
agreement in 1978.162 In 1985, one shareholder (Gray) notified the
corporation of his intent to sell his shares to an outside party. He
thus requested that the corporation appoint an appraiser to deter-
mine the value of his shares.16 The remaining shareholders denied
consent for the sale and, accordingly, voted not to appoint an ap-
praiser. 6"' Gray then filed a writ of mandamus with the district
court seeking to compel the corporation to allow him to sell his
shares. 16 5 After losing in district court, Gray appealed to the Mon-
tana Supreme Court.
In denying Gray relief, the Montana Supreme Court held that
a reasonable restraint on alienation is enforceable.16 6 The test for
determining reasonableness is "whether the restraint is sufficiently
needed by the particular enterprise to justify overriding the gen-
eral policy against restraints on alienation.' 1 67 In applying this bal-
ancing approach, the Gray court considered three factors. First,
the court noted that it was the original intent of the parties to
prohibit the entrance of third parties into the closely-held corpora-
tion.'68 Second, a perpetual limit on share transferability did not
exist because the agreement remained valid only so long as all of
the initial stockholders were alive. 69 Third, the enactment of a
statutory right to contractually restrict share transferability, 7 0
which occurred three years after the parties' agreement, evidenced
160. 227 Mont. 51, 737 P.2d 475 (1987).
161. Id. at 52, 737 P.2d at 475.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 53, 737 P.2d at 476.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 56, 737 P.2d at 478.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 55, 737 P.2d at 477.
169. Id. The actual agreement provided: "1. So long as all of the STOCKHOLDERS
are alive, they each shall not encumber or dispose of the stock of the CORPORATION,
which he or she now owns or may hereafter acquire without the written consent of the
remaining STOCKHOLDERS and that of the CORPORATION." Id. at 54, 737 P.2d at 477.
The court presumed that the agreement terminated once all of the initial five stock-
holders were no longer alive. Id. at 55, 737 P.2d at 477. An equally plausible interpretation
is that as long as one stockholder remained alive, who could represent all of the existing
stockholders, the agreement remained valid.
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"legislative approval of the action previously taken by the
stockholders."
17 1
In finding the agreement reasonable, the Gray court demon-
strated its willingness to enforce unanimous shareholder agree-
ments that are limited to a definite term. Furthermore, by negative
implication, the court struck down a provision restricting share
transfer for an indefinite term. This implication leaves uncertain
the question of whether the court places greater weight on the
sanctity of shareholder agreements or the preservation of the alien-
ability of shares. The court's emphasis on the finite nature of the
agreement also undermines one of the primary benefits of
incorporation-perpetuality.
In addition, the Montana Supreme Court deviated from its
previous trend of considering shareholder expectations at the time
of dispute. Instead, the court adopted the district court's interpre-
tation of the parties' intent "at the time of entering into" the origi-
nal express contract.17 2 The court omitted any discussion of equi-
ties or the interrelationship of shareholders in ownership or
management at the time of the dispute. In short, in upholding the
shareholders' agreement, the court enforced the expectations of all
five shareholders ex ante.
One result of the court's decision was a cost savings to the ma-
jority shareholders. Although a disruptive force remained in the
corporate ownership, the majority shareholders were put in a bar-
gaining position that minimized future transaction costs when
dealing with any minority shareholder. The majority shareholders
were further able to prevent an outside party from disrupting team
value and disrupting the balance of asset specificity. The minority
shareholder's rights, on the other hand, were valued consistently
with their value at incorporation; he got what he bargained for and
no more. This approach assumes, rightly or wrongly, that the mi-
nority shareholder was fully aware of the legal consequences of the
agreement at its inception.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Gray is the court's ap-
plication of the statutory provisions referred to in the case. In ef-
fect, the Gray court asserted that when the legislature enacts ena-
bling statutes subsequent to the shareholder agreement, two
results are possible. If the statutory provision has an adverse effect
on the shareholder agreement, the statute is irrelevant. Conversely,
if the statute and agreement are consistent, then the court should
171. Gray, 227 Mont. at 56, 737 P.2d at 478.
172. Id. at 54, 737 P.2d at 477.
[Vol. 52
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 52 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/5
EFFICIENCY VS. EQUITY
view the statute as legislative approval of the shareholders' actions.
The question left open by the court is what effect will a subse-
quent mandatory provision, rather than an enabling provision,
have on a shareholder agreement? Regardless, the court's strong
reliance on statutory language suggests that it will utilize the new
close corporation legislation as influential language whether the
parties elect or reject its provisions.
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
From a narrow perspective, one can determine the compatibil-
ity of the MCCA and Montana case law by comparing the common
law remedies promulgated by the Montana Supreme Court to the
judicial remedies that the MCCA allows. In the five cases ad-
dressed, the Montana Supreme 'Court imposed a variety of reme-
dies, including dismissing directors, 7 ' retransferring property and
reimbursing for fair market value,1 4 ordering dissolution, " 5 requir-
ing a forced sale of stock, 7 6 and enforcing an express shareholder
agreement that restricted share transfers. 17 The MCCA allows suf-
ficient judicial discretion to encompass all of these remedies. 7 8
The Montana Supreme Court's rationale in defining dissolu-
tion as a remedy of last resort is also consistent with the MCCA.
Dissolution was granted in Fox when the court found that there
was "no alternative adequate remedy,"' 79 yet in Maddox, the court
imposed a forced sale of stock as an alternative to liquidation. 8 '
Likewise, the MCCA provides that dissolution is preferably limited
to situations in which all other relief "has failed to resolve themat-
ters in dispute."' 8'
The Montana Supreme Court has also given deference to the
provisions of the MCCA. In Gray, the court looked to statutory
language for guidance in determining share transfer rights. The
court recognized that statutory enactments represent legislative
approval or disapproval of certain corporate actions. 8 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that only when an otherwise valid share-
173. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (Thisted).
174. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (Skierka).
175. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (Fox).
176. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (Maddox).
177. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text (Gray).
178. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-504 (1989). See also supra note 76 and accompany-
ing text.
179. Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 215, 645 P.2d 929, 936 (1982).
180. Maddox v. Norman, 206 Mont. 1, 16, 669 P.2d 230, 238 (1983).
181. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-504(1)(b) (1989).
182. Gray v. Harris Land & Cattle Co., 227 Mont. 51, 56, 737 P.2d 475, 478 (1987).
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holder agreement conflicts with an expressed statute will the court
strike down the agreement.'83 This reasoning is consistent with the
MCCA's provisions allowing shareholders to adopt personalized
share transfer restrictions in the shareholder agreement. 184
In short, the Montana Supreme Court's past common law
remedies and its treatment of statutory entitlements are within the
MCCA's guidelines. Nevertheless, this limited comparison is mis-
leading; the MCCA grants Montana courts such broad discretion
that almost any form of relief is within the MCCA's guidelines.
Therefore, to determine whether the courts are utilizing their dis-
cretion to obtain results consistent with legislative objectives, it is
necessary to analyze the compatibility of the MCCA and Montana
case law from a policy standpoint.
This article has set forth the efficient and equitable attributes
of the MCCA and Montana case law. The MCCA, simply put, is
legislation that seeks to avoid costs in on-going operations while
imposing significant costs in dispute resolution. The MCCA prefers
efficient corporate operations, yet it is willing to accept the exten-
sive costs inherent in relying on the judiciary to resolve disputes.
The result is a very inefficient dispute resolution process.
The MCCA does offer the shareholders the opportunity to
ameliorate the costs of dispute resolution. In an effort to prevent
majority shareholders from oppressing minority shareholders and
thus avoid the litigation costs of dispute resolution, the MCCA al-
lows shareholders to mandate consensual rule.185 Election of this
entitlement, however, is subject to the majority shareholders' par-
tisan ideology arising from individualistic values. The majority
shareholders are unlikely to devalue their rights in favor of a more
equitable shareholder agreement that favors the minority
shareholders.
This biased foundation produces agreements that leave the
minority shareholders with judicial paternalism as their sole pro-
tection. For the most part, the MCCA recognizes this problem in
its broad grant of equitable remedies for the courts to utilize in
resolving minority shareholder oppression. Unfortunately, the
court's effort to blend equitable principles with efficient con-
tracting, in the hope of striking a balance between the fundamen-
tal precepts of opportunism and minority rights, presupposes a ju-
diciary with an equitable wand.
The Montana Supreme Court has progressed along a learning
183. Id.
184. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
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curve in its continuing development of the relevant factors the
court must consider when resolving close corporation disputes. The
court initially inquired into both implied expectations and ex-
pressed intent."8 6 After broadening the scope of its expectation
analysis to include shareholder expectations at the time of the dis-
pute,187 the court used the parties' expectations as a means to yield
a result consistent with minimizing the costs associated with intra-
corporate conflicts..88 Then, in its last decision, the court looked to
an express shareholder agreement to discern the intent of the par-
ties, and enforced that agreement to uphold the majority's
expectations.18 9
The court's change in substantive analysis coincides with a
change in underlying policy consequences. The court's broadening
of its expectation-based analysis in the earlier cases tends to im-
prove the likelihood of equitable outcomes. Its tightening of its ex-
pectation-based analysis in the last two cases, however, elevates
the importance of efficiency in its analysis, which results in cost
considerations displacing equitable concerns.
One can view this vacillation in policy effects that stem from
the court's decisions in three ways. First, arguably no trend exists.
The differing fact patterns make any viable trend indiscernible.
The court merely imposed its subjective desires to reach what it
felt was a just result based on ad hoc facts. This approach lends
little merit to our system of stare decisis and further ignores the
court's conscious change in the policies underlying its decisions.
Furthermore, theory determines the facts and how to distinguish
among them. Therefore, policy choices invariably affect every judi-
cial decision.1 90
A second approach argues that a discernible trend in substan-
tive law exists, but the promotion or suppression of any underlying
policy is merely coincidental. The Montana Supreme Court en-
forces the law as it exists and the result is tied only to facts rather
than a predetermined policy. Promoting this view fails to account
for the scattered reasoning in the court's opinions. Any recognition
of a consistent application of objective criteria remains elusive.
Even when the court relies upon statutory law, it often does so to
support "discretionary rather than mandatory" interpretation of
186. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 130-34, 156-58 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
190. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITIcs 32 (1975).
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statutes.""1 Moreover, even though it seems possible for the court
to separate itself from any particular theory, when one does this,
one is stepping into another theory rather than into the realm of
plain facts.1"2
A final approach is that the court is predisposed to advance a
specific paradigm. 193 This predisposition may be either intentional
or inherent. The predisposition is intentional if the court know-
ingly fabricates its opinions to fit the mold of the paradigm that
the court feels is the normative basis for judicial analysis. The pre-
disposition is inherent when judges are consciously unaware of the
policies they are promoting. Judges' predispositions reflect the at-
titudes of the politicians who appoint them or the constituency the
judges represent.19 4 A judge's inherent predisposition thus aligns
itself with society's then existing morality or reason.195
Critics of the predisposition approach argue that it assumes
too much; that it is too speculative to reach implicit policy conclu-
sions from the court's express opinion. Yet, when opinions mani-
fest a paradigmatic reversal and fail to account for that change
through an objective application of substantive law, the predisposi-
tion approach appears the most viable of the three alternatives.9 "
191. See Maddox v. Norman, 206 Mont. 1, 10, 669 P.2d 230, 235 (1983) (quoting the
comments to the Montana Business Corporation Act).
192. R. UNGER, supra note 190, at 33.
193. Paradigms are "universally recognized ... achievements that for a time provide
model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners." T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCINTIFc REVOLUTIONS at viii (2d ed. 1970). A paradigm is "like an accepted judicial
decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under
new or more stringent conditions." Id. at 23.
194. For instance, the Reagan administration's judicial appointments are certainly in-
fluencing American jurisprudence. See Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Conservatism v. A Prin-
cipled Judicial Activism, 10 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 273 (1987).
195. The inherent disposition approach differs from the second approach because of
the difference in judicial appointment. The second approach assumes that political pres-
sures are relatively minor, whereas, the predisposition approach assumes that the appoint-
ment or election of a judge is premised on the judge's and the appointer's political views.
The predisposition approach, similar to the first approach, admittedly places a dimin-
ished emphasis on the precedential value of past decisions. However, once the preferred
paradigm is established, the court can entrench itself firmly into that line of reasoning by
relying on precedents rather than illuminating underlying policy choices. Reliance on prece-
dents remains strong until the political makeup of the court changes, requiring decisional
reversals to promote the new paradigm.
196. Eleanor Fox also emphasizes politics' role in adjudication, stating:
Since so much of the law being interpreted by the courts was designed to give a
boost to the less advantaged, and since Americans today are so receptive to the
claim that law should be efficient, advocacy of a generous use of law and econom-
ics sounds a political theme.
See Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Anti-Trust as a
Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 588 (1986). See also Posner, Wealth Maximization Revis-
ited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 85, 103 (1985) ("It must also be emphasized
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Presuming that the Montana Supreme Court is predisposed to
advance a specific paradigm, it probably will discriminatorily inter-
pret any new statutory scheme to produce a result consistent with
its current preference. The two broadest and most popular options
are equity and efficiency. The current trend of the court to remain
consistent with one of these paradigms, therefore, becomes para-
mount in determining the probable efficacy of new statutes. Fur-
thermore, the importance of judicial trends increases when a statu-
tory scheme proposes an active, discretionary role for courts-a
role that the MCCA adopts.197
The merits of the Montana Supreme Court's expressed reli-
ance on an equitable expectation-based analysis commingles with a
cost avoidance analysis. In striking a balance between these two
analytical frameworks, the court likewise balances the competing
policies of equity and efficiency. This compromising predisposition
has yielded a variety of ingredients in the past, which the court
should now mix together to produce a coherent structure for
resolving future close corporation disputes.
There are four dominant factors that the court should con-
sider when resolving close corporation disputes. These factors are
interdependent and the court should consider them in relative de-
grees of importance. The court should first look to any express
shareholder agreement for guidance in determining the original in-
tentions and expectations of the parties. It should next consider
both minority and majority shareholders' expectations of owner-
ship, control, employment and income at the time that the dispute
arises. Third, once the court makes an equitable determination of
shareholders' rights based on the first two considerations, it should
then account for the cost implications in formulating an appropri-
ate remedy. Finally, whenever possible, the court should attempt
to avoid imposing costs on both the instant parties and on society
in general, to the extent that it does not prejudice the sharehold-
ers' equitable rights.
If the Montana Supreme Court uses the collective wisdom of
the five cases discussed in this article to solidify its analytical
framework, then the court will align its decisions with the underly-
ing policies of the MCCA. If the court instead ignores the merits of
an expectation-based analysis and regresses to an analysis based
solely on the strict construction of expressed agreements, then the
legislature's broad grant of judicial discretion presumably to pro-
that it is political philosophy that I am expounding.").
197. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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tect the oppressed shareholder becomes moot. The choice is left to
the court."'
198. See Samuels & Mercuro, Posnerian Law and Economics on the Bench, 4 INT'L
Rav. L. & ECON. 107, 113 (1984) ("The answers to efficiency related questions in law are
ultimately a matter of judicial choice .... ").
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